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I. INTRODUCTION
The Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants
Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the Use-
ful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."' Pursu-
ant to this power, Congress has enacted a system of copyright protec-
© Copyright held by the NEBiRAsKA LAW REVIEW.
* Instructor, Stetson College of Law.
1. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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tion designed to motivate authors2 to produce new works.3 In keeping
with the essential purpose of the Copyright Clause,4 that system has,
for more than two centuries, maintained a balance between the incen-
tives of authors to produce works, and the interests of the public in
having the greatest possible access to those works.5
Recently, however, Congress has enacted two laws that shift the
balance of the copyright system decisively in favor of rightsholders.6
The first was partly motivated by recent advances in technology that
allow any visual 7 or auditory8 copyrighted work to be copied and re-
transmitted over the Internet without significant cost or noticeable
loss of fidelity.9 Congress's answer to the new ease of copying afforded
by this technology has been to provide for civil and criminal penalties
against persons who circumvent technological barriers erected by
rightsholders against the copying of digital works.1O In the increas-
ingly digitized world of the near future, this will have the effect of
outlawing many previously legal public uses of copyrighted materials.
The second law extended the term of copyright from the life of the
author plus fifty years to life plus seventy.1 ' This will have the effect
of keeping currently protected works out of the public domain for at
least another twenty years. 12 This increase will have no meaningful
effect upon authors' incentives to produce new works.13 Moreover,
coupled with the other increases in the copyright term over the past
century, this new extension raises the possibility that the term of
copyright will continue to increase perpetually, thus preventing free
public enjoyment of any work produced after the 1920s.14
In sum, Congress's most recent copyright legislation is inconsistent
with the Copyright Clause, in that it expands the scope of authors'
"exclusive Right" beyond its proper bounds, and expands the duration
of that right beyond any reasonable interpretation of the term "for
2. The term "authors" is used throughout this Article in its constitutional sense.
3. See infra Part III.
4. This term is used to refer to the portions of the Intellectual Property Clause that
are specific to copyright.
5. See infra Part IV.
6. This term refers to authors, their licensees, and their assignees.
7. See generally Sharon Appel, Copyright, Digitization of Images, and Art Museums:
Cyberspace and Other New Frontiers, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 149 (1999).
8. See generally Adam P. Segal, Dissemination of Digitized Music on the Internet: A
Challenge to the Copyright Act, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 97
(1996).
9. For an extensive discussion of the Internet and related technological issues, see
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
10. See infra Part VI.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See infra Part VII.C.
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limited Times." Admittedly, it is possible that other provisions of the
Constitution, such as the Commerce Clause15 or the treaty power,16
might expand the scope of the Copyright Clause in this respect. More-
over, non-constitutional bodies of law may have a significant impact
on these issues.1 7
Nonetheless, any attempt to justify the judicial invalidation of Acts
of Congress affecting copyright must begin with an examination of
those acts in the context of the Copyright Clause. This Article under-
takes such a beginning, and is therefore restricted to that context.
II. THE PURPOSE AND NATURE OF THE
COPYRIGHT CLAUSE
The Copyright Clause owes its origin to two strong beliefs among
the Framers of the Constitution. The first was that uniform, nation-
wide copyright protection was essential for the generation and dissem-
ination of new works.'S In the words of James Madison: "The utility
of this power will scarcely be questioned .... The States cannot sepa-
rately make effectual provision for either [copyrights or patents], and
most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws
passed at the instance of Congress."19
The second belief was that, in light of the unhappy experience of
the British with Crown monopolies, 20 it was essential to limit the
power of the federal government to impose costs on society as a whole
15. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence
of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089, 1131-32 (1998); Robert Patrick
Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent
Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 63 (2000). But see United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that portions of the Violence Against Women Act
went beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause).
16. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 99 (1879) ("In what we have here said we
wish to be understood as leaving untouched the whole question of the treaty-
making power over trade-marks, and of the duty of Congress to pass any laws
necessary to carry treaties into effect.").
17. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 107-10 (1997); Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of
Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REv. 511, 525-33 (1997);
David McGowan, Free Contracting, Fair Competition, and Article 2B: Some Re-
flections on Federal Competition Policy, Information Transactions, and "Aggres-
sive Neutrality," 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1173 (1998); Raymond T. Nimmer,
Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property
Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827, 829 (1998).
18. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989).
19. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 267 (James
Madison) (H. Lodge ed., 1908)).
20. See generally Edward C. Waltersheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and
Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the
United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1994).
[Vol. 80:64
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to benefit a favored few.21 Accordingly, the framers modeled the
Copyright Clause on the Statute of Anne,22 a British law that pro-
vided for a term of copyright protection while largely supplanting the
earlier system of Crown favoritism and censorship. 23
The framers' belief that copyright protection was necessary for the
dissemination of new works was solidly grounded in economic theory
that is at least as valid today as it was when the Copyright Clause was
written. Producing a new work of authorship involves considerable
expenditure of money, time, and effort.24 Likewise, publishing and
disseminating such a work can be costly.25 Unlike an author, how-
ever, a copyist need incur only the costs of publication and
dissemination.26
Thus, absent copyrighted protection, copyists could always either
deprive authors of their markets by selling substantially the same
product at a lower price, or by selling at the same price while enjoying
a higher profit margin. 27 In either event, copyists could benefit more
from authors' initial labor than would authors themselves. In sum,
without copyright protection, authors would have far less incentive to
produce new works.28
Accordingly, the economic effect of copyright protection is to re-
serve to authors the monetary value of their works by making sales of
infringing works more difficult and less profitable. This protection en-
sures that those who produce copyrightable works are far better able
to support themselves by doing so. 29 In effect, copyright protection
permits one of the most important components of any free market sys-
tem: specialization. Absent such protection, fewer authors who were
not independently wealthy could afford to devote the time and energy
to becoming adept at writing, art, music, or other activities whose
fruits are protectable by copyright.30
The temporary nature of copyright protection provided for by the
Copyright Clause encourages the widespread dissemination of works
of authorship. When a work's copyright protection eventually lapses,
21. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966); see generally Irah Donner,
The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Why Did the Framers Include It
With Unanimous Approval?, 36 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 361, 365-68 (1992) (discussing
the influence of English copyright laws).
22. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1710, 8 Ann., ch. 19 (Eng.).
23. See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT 27-28
(1991).
24. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326-28 (1989).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 967 (1990).
28. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985).
29. See Landes & Posner, supra note 24, at 326-28.
30. See id. at 328-30.
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its sale price necessarily tends to fall toward the marginal cost of pro-
ducing a copy of that work. 3 1 This decreased cost tends to increase
demand, thus ensuring that the work will enjoy the widest possible
range of distribution.32
III. TWO CENTURIES OF RIGHTSHOLDERS' ADVANCES
The past two centuries have seen a vast increase in both the scope
and duration of copyright protection, coupled with a similarly vast in-
crease in the wealth and political influence of the copyright industries.
The first U.S. copyright statute applied only to books, maps, and
charts, reserving to authors the rights to such works for a fourteen-
year term, coupled with a renewal term of the same duration. 33 By
the end of the second century of copyright protection, the scope of pro-
tection had expanded to encompass all original works of expression
fixed in tangible media, and the period of exclusivity enjoyed by au-
thors had reached the term of life plus fifty years.34
Meanwhile, the value of copyrighted works had increased to the
point where copyright-protected industries were poised to become pre-
dominant in the American economy. 3 5 With this new wealth, the
copyright industries have also come to enjoy very substantial political
influence, so much so that it is only a small exaggeration to claim that
"the debate over intellectual property rights has become an economic
battle by the producers of computer software and entertainment me-
dia waged to determine who will govern the world economy in the first
half of the next century."3 6
Any industries that enjoy both a government-enforced monopoly
and considerable political power are naturally tempted to use them to
their own benefit, and the copyright industries are no exception: "The
legislative process is skewed to disproportionately and consistently
privilege powerful, well-organized owner interests at the expense of
the interests of the public in use and reuse of copyrighted informa-
tional and imaginative works."3 7
In the waning years of the twentieth century, the legislative ad-
vantages enjoyed by the copyright industries have reached a new
peak. As the following sections will show, new legislation has resulted
31. See id. at 328.
32. See id.
33. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
34. See Litman, supra note 27, at 993; Nimmer, supra note 17, at 855.
35. See Richard Siklos & Steven V. Brull, Free Music on the Web Has Let the Genie
out of the Bottle, Bus. WK., May 29, 2000, at 121.
36. Jon M. Garon, Media & Monopoly in the Information Age: Slowing the Conver-
gence at the Marketplace of Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENr. L.J. 491, 498 (1999).
37. ROBERT L. BARD & LEWIS KURLANTZWICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION: DURATION,
TERM EXTENSION, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE MAKING OF COPYRIGHT POLICY
223 n.303 (1999).
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in an elevation of rightsholders' interests over those of the public at
large to a degree that threatens the balance of the Copyright Clause.
IV. THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF AUTHORS
AT THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY
A. Congress's Discretion
The Supreme Court has made clear that the task of striking the
balance of competing interests between rightsholders and the public
in copyright and patent legislation is one that belongs, in the first in-
stance at least, to Congress. Congress has broad authority "to imple-
ment the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which
in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim."3s The Court
has also been clear in indicating that this truism applies specifically in
the context of legislation that responds to pressures imposed on the
copyright system by new technologies:
Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress
when major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted mater-
ials. Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to
accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are
inevitably implicated by such new technology.
3 9
As the remainder of this Article will indicate, however, there are
limits to how far this deference to Congress can be extended. The next
two subsections will lay the groundwork for an examination of those
limits. First, a treatment of recent developments in the fair use doc-
trine will show that even against the backdrop of Congress's broad
discretion in implementing copyright legislation, the touchstone for
statutory interpretation remains the Copyright Clause and its twin
purposes: preserving authors' incentives to produce new works, and
maximizing the public's access to those works. Second, an examina-
tion of recent Supreme Court cases will provide a basis for determinat-
ing when legislative acts pass beyond the boundaries of the Copyright
Clause.
B. The Fair Use Doctrine
The fair use doctrine is the attempt of the judiciary to "strike a
balance between the dual risks created by the copyright system: on
the one hand, that depriving authors of their monopoly will reduce
their incentive to create, and, on the other, that granting authors a
complete monopoly will reduce the creative ability of others."40 In the
Copyright Act of 1976,41 Congress codified the doctrine as follows:
38. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
39. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
40. Id. at 479 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
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Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phone
records or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright.
4 2
In lieu of a specific, concrete definition of "fair use," Congress elected
to provide a loose, four-factor test:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use the factors to be considered shall include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
4 3
Three recent Supreme Court cases interpreting the fair use doc-
trine have demonstrated that, in keeping with the purposes of the
Copyright Clause described above, the doctrine should operate accord-
ing to two principles.4 4 First, it should forbid competing uses by
others to the extent necessary to preserve the incentives of authors to
create new works. Second, it should permit as many other uses as
possible. Although these cases were decided primarily on statutory
rather than constitutional grounds, they are highly instructive in as-
sessing how copyright doctrine can serve, or disserve, the purposes of
the Copyright Clause.
The first of these cases is Sony Corporation of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.,45 a case involving the impact of new copying tech-
nology on copyright doctrine. Sony sold "Betamax" videotape record-
ers to consumers, some of whom used them to record broadcasts of
television programs owned by the plaintiffs. 46 Some of those consum-
ers used the equipment to establish videotape "libraries" of their fa-
vorite programs. 47 Universal claimed both that the recording of its
programs by Betamax owners constituted copyright infringement, and
that Sony was liable for contributory infringement.48 The district
42. Sony, 464 U.S. at 479.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
44. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., (1994); Sony, 464 U.S. 417 (1989); Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
45. Sony, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
46. See id. at 420-21.
47. See id.
48. See id.
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court disagreed, and entered judgment for Sony.49 The court of ap-
peals reversed.5 0
A five-Justice majority of the Supreme Court found that the ap-
proach of the court of appeals, which would have allowed the plaintiffs
to enjoin or levy royalties upon the sale of video recorders, would have
"enlarge[d] the scope of respondents' statutory monopolies to encom-
pass control over an article of commerce that is not the subject of copy-
right protection."51 The Court characterized its decision as a
"rejection of respondents' unprecedented attempt to impose copyright
liability upon the distributors of copying equipment."52
It had long been established that liability as a contributory in-
fringer can be found against one who knowingly and intentionally as-
sists another's copyright infringement.5 3 The Sony Court limited this
doctrine by excepting the act of providing the means by which another
could commit copyright infringement.5 4
The Court ruled that liability could only be imposed when "the
'contributory' infringer was in a position to control the use of copy-
righted works by others and had authorized the use without permis-
sion from the copyright owner."55 Applying this rule to Sony's
situation led the Court to conclude that "the sale of copying equip-
ment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute
contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of sub-
stantial noninfringing uses."5 6
Thus, the outcome of the dispute turned on whether consumers
could use the equipment at issue in ways that were noninfringing or
that fell within the scope of the fair use doctrine. The Court found
that they could, noting that most consumers used their recorders
mainly for the purpose of "time-shifting," i.e., recording a program for
viewing at a later, more convenient time.57 Because the plaintiffs had
failed to demonstrate that time-shifting had "impaired the commercial
value of their copyrights or ha[d] created any likelihood of future
49. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal.
1979).
50. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1981).
51. Sony, 464 U.S. at 421.
52. Id.
53. See David Nimmer, An Odyssey Through Copyright's Vicarious Defenses, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 162 (1998). For an early example of the doctrine applied in the
context of a new technology, see Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911)
(finding the producer of an unauthorized film version of a novel liable for contrib-
utory infringement).
54. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 436.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
57. See id. at 421.
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harm," the Court found that at least one of the substantial uses to
which the copying equipment could be put was a fair use.58
Although it was decided in the context of analog recording equip-
ment, the Sony case is of considerable significance with respect to the
digital copying issues raised below. In Sony, the Court concluded that
allowing rightsholders to suppress a new copying technology was not
necessary to ensure that authors would reap the financial benefits of
their efforts, even though that technology was subject to abuse.59
Similar issues are explored in the following sections.
The second member of the trilogy is Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,60 a case in which the Court had to define
just how little copying could be "unfair" in the fair use context. The
Nation magazine published a short article titled "The Ford Memoirs-
Behind the Nixon Pardon."61 The article included extended excerpts
from a purloined copy of President Ford's autobiography, which was to
be published shortly thereafter. 62 The Nation intended its article to
"scoop" one that was scheduled to appear in Time magazine. 63 The
Time article was to contain authorized excerpts from the book, for
whose use Time had agreed to pay a fee to Harper & Row, President
Ford's publisher.64 When The Nation published its article, Time can-
celed its agreement with the publisher.65
Harper & Row successfully sued The Nation for copyright infringe-
ment.66 The court of appeals reversed, however, finding that the fair
use doctrine covered The Nation's actions.67 A six-Justice majority of
the Supreme Court agreed with Time and the trial court, finding that
"the fair use doctrine has always precluded a use that 'supersede[s]
the use of the original,"' 68 and that The Nation's copying of the manu-
script "had not merely the incidental effect but the intended purpose of
supplanting the copyright holder's commercially valuable right of first
publication."69
Moreover, the Court found that, even though the amount of mate-
rial The Nation had copied was comparatively small, the copied por-
tion of the manuscript was "essentially the heart of the book."70 The
58. Id.
59. See id. at 456.
60. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
61. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 542 (1985).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. Harper & Row, Publishers, 971 U.S. at 550 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas.
342, 344-345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1875) (No. 4,901)).
69. Id. at 562.
70. Id. at 565.
[Vol. 80:64
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copied material concerned the motives and reasoning that lay behind
President Ford's decision to pardon his predecessor. 7 1 These were
matters of widespread interest, and they were the primary selling
points for the book.72 In short, The Nation's article provided informa-
tion that made buying the book superfluous for many consumers.7 3
This was of critical importance to the Court, which remarked that
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work is "undoubtedly the single most important element of
fair use."74 Because of the importance of that factor, the Court found
that the court of appeals had placed too much reliance on what the
latter had characterized as the "meager" or even "infinitesimal"
amount of material copied.7 5 The Court concluded that "'[flair use,
when properly applied, is limited to copying by others which does not
materially impair the marketability of the work which is copied."'76
This case is significant for its sharp focus on the issue of authors'
incentive to produce works. The Court's refusal to adopt mechanical
formulae for how much material could be copied under the fair use
doctrine is important to several of the issues raised in the following
sections.
The last of the three cases is Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,77
in which the Court addressed the fair use doctrine in the context of
parody.7 8 A musical group named 2 Live Crew recorded a commercial
parody of Roy Orbison's song, "Oh, Pretty Woman."7 9 The parody drew
heavily on the text of Orbison's song, with the result that the lyrics of
the two songs were strikingly (and deliberately) similar.so When sued
for copyright infringement, 2 Live Crew argued that its use of
Orbison's work as a parody was fair despite its commercial nature.8 1
The trial court found that it was "extremely unlikely that 2 Live
Crew's song could adversely affect the market for the original."82
Based largely on this consideration, the trial court found that 2 Live
Crew's copying of Orbison's original work was fair use, and rendered
summary judgment in the group's favor.8 3 The court of appeals re-
versed and remanded, finding that the trial court had given insuffi-
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 565-69.
74. Id. at 566.
75. Id. at 569.
76. Id. at 566-67 (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10[D]
(1984)).
77. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
78. See id. at 574.
79. See id. at 571.
80. See id. at 572.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 573.
83. See id.
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cient weight to the Supreme Court's declaration in Sony that "every
commercial use.., is presumptively... unfair."8 4
The court of appeals reasoned that, even if the accused work could
properly be characterized as a parody, the admittedly commercial na-
ture of that parody made the trial court's finding of fair use unsustain-
able because 2 Live Crew had "tak[en] the heart of the original and
ma[de] it the heart of a new work,"8 5 and that, in doing so, it had
taken too much, both qualitatively and quantitatively, to be protected
by the fair use doctrine.8 6
The court of appeals also invoked Harper's declaration that the po-
tential damage to the market for the original, as well as for derivative
works based on that original, is the most important element of fair
use.8 7 The court of appeals concluded that the trial court should have
presumed that, because the accused use was commercial in nature,
damage to the market for the original was established.8 8
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the view of the court of
appeals that "harm for purposes of the fair use analysis [can be] estab-
lished by the presumption attaching to commercial uses."8 9 The Court
characterized the fair use inquiry as one that is "not to be simplified
with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes,
calls for case-by-case analysis."90 And in that analysis, all four of the
factors are significant; they may not be weighed or assessed individu-
ally: "All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light
of the purposes of copyright."9 1 The Court reversed and remanded for
further findings relevant to fair use.9 2
The most significant feature of Campbell is that it renounced
bright lines and clear formulae for fair use in favor of case-by-case
analysis.93 This is true of Sony9 4 and Harper9 5 as well. If the highest
Court in the land cannot easily, automatically, and categorically de-
fine what uses of copyrighted material are fair, then rightsholders
cannot do so. Moreover, the machines and software that rightsholders
84. Id. at 574.
85. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1438 (6th Cir. 1992).
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 1437, 1439 (characterizing 2 Live Crew's use of Mr. Orbison's work as
having a "blatantly commercial purpose" that "prevent[ed] th[e] parody from be-
ing a fair use").
89. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574 (quoting Acuff-Rose Music, 972 F.2d at 1438-39).
90. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.
91. Id. at 578 (citations omitted).
92. See id. at 594.
93. See id. at 577.
94. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984).
95. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
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will seek to use to implement anti-copying schemes will be unable to
do so as well. 96
C. Temporary Copyright and the Public Domain
The public domain consists of all sources of information and ex-
pressions that may be freely copied. Thus, it extends to "works, or
components thereof, that are not eligible for copyright, works that
were created before copyright existed, works that have had their copy-
rights expire, and intellectual property that is defined by the Copy-
right Act to fall outside the scope of its protection."97 The public
domain is part and parcel of the copyright system; while the copyright
monopoly is "intended to motivate the creative activity of authors," it
is also intended "to allow the public access to the products of their
genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired."g8
Until fairly recently, the principle that the public domain is of con-
stitutional stature was more clearly established in patent law than in
copyright. In 1966, for example, the Supreme Court ruled unani-
mously that the Intellectual Property Clause coupled its grant of
power to Congress with limits on that power:
[The Clause] is both a grant of power and a limitation .... The Congress in
the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by
the stated constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly
without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained
thereby. Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict
free access to materials already available. 9 9
More recently, the Court has issued another unanimous opinion in
the patent context that defines explicitly the relationship between
statutory exclusive rights and the constitutional purposes they are in-
tended to serve: Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.100
Bonito Boats designed a hull for a recreational boat, expending
considerable effort and expense in doing so.1 1 Neither that hull de-
sign, nor the process by which the hull was built, was protected by
patent.'0 2 The hull was popular in its market, and boats incorporat-
ing that hull sold well both within and outside Florida.103 Using a
direct molding process, Thunder Craft copied Bonito's hull, and there-
after marketed a boat incorporating that hull.104 Thus, Thunder
96. See infra Part VI.D.
97. Garon, supra note 36, at 545 (citations omitted).
98. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
99. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966).
100. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
101. See id. at 144.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 145.
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Craft was able to compete against Bonito without having to incur the
expense of designing its own hull.05
Bonito sued Thunder Craft under the Florida anti-molding stat-
ute.10 6 The trial court found for Thunder Craft on the ground that the
Florida anti-molding statute was void under the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution because the statute conflicted with federal pat-
ent law.l0 7 The court of appeals and the Florida Supreme Court
affirmed.108
The Supreme Court agreed, ruling that federal patent law affords
only "a limited opportunity to obtain a property right in an idea. Once
an inventor has decided to lift the veil of secrecy from his work, he
must choose the protection of a federal patent or the dedication of his
idea to the public at large."1o 9 Thus, an inventor "'must content him-
self with either secrecy or legal monopoly."'lo In marketing the new
hull without obtaining patent protection, Bonito assumed the risk that
a competitor would take advantage of the effort and cost Bonito had
spent in designing it.1
In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed that "[t]he Patent
Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innova-
tion and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without
any concomitant advance in the 'Progress of Science and useful
Arts."' 112 The Court reiterated its view that
the Clause contains both a grant of power and certain limitations upon the
exercise of that power. Congress may not create patent monopolies of unlim-
ited duration, nor may it 'authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are
to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access
to materials already available.' 1 1 3
Thus, when a patent expires, the invention for which it was
granted passes into the public domain, "'and the right to make the
thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public property.'"11 4
Thus, at that point, the public has "'the same right to make use of [the
formerly patented invention] as if it had never been patented.'"1' 5
The period of exclusivity provided for by patent law provides the
incentive for innovation, but after that period, the kind of copying in
105. See id.
106. See id. at 144 (construing FLA. STAT. ch. 559.94 (1987)).
107. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 145.
108. See id. at 145-46.
109. Id. at 149.
110. Id. (quoting Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d
516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946) (Hand, J.)).
111. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 149-151.
112. Id. at 146.
113. Id. (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)).
114. Id. at 152 (quoting Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896)).
115. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152 (quoting Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562,
572 (1893)).
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which Thunder Craft engaged is not only permissible, but desira-
ble.116 Without the ability to copy, other inventors would be deprived
of valuable techniques, and the public would be deprived of more de-
sirable and affordable products made possible by the use of those tech-
niques. As the Court recognized, "imitation and refinement through
imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood
of a competitive economy."l17
The Court also recognized that in addition to providing the incen-
tive for inventors to develop and share useful new ideas that will even-
tually enrich the public domain, the patent system serves the
purposes of the Intellectual Property Clause by the protection it de-
nies. 1 8 The patent system protects inventors and the general public
from depletion of the common store of knowledge by denying protec-
tion to inventions that are obvious or of limited novelty. "'[Tihe strin-
gent requirements for patent protection seek to ensure that ideas in
the public domain remain there for the use of the public.""' 9
Thus, the Court found a strong federal policy in the Intellectual
Property Clause and the federal statutes implementing it of "'allowing
free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws
leave in the public domain.'"i20 Because the Florida statute violated
this policy, it was void under the Supremacy Clause.121
In yet another 9-0 decision, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.,122 the Supreme Court extended this under-
standing of the constitutional status of the public domain into the
copyright context. 123 Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc. was a
local public telephone company that served customers in northwest
Kansas. 124 Pursuant to state regulations, Rural published an up-
dated telephone directory every year.' 2 5 Feist Publications, Inc., was
a publishing company that specialized in telephone directories for
116. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 147.
119. Id. at 150 (quoting Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979)).
120. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 153 (quoting Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,
376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964)).
121. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 159-60 ( T]he Florida statute allows petitioner to
reassert a substantial property right in the idea, thereby constricting the spec-
trum of useful public knowledge. Moreover, it does so without the careful protec-
tions of high standards of innovation and limited monopoly contained in the
federal scheme. We think it clear that such protection conflicts with the federal
policy 'that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common good un-
less they are protected by a valid patent.'" (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S.
653, 668 (1969))).
122. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
123. See id. at 343.
124. See id. at 342.
125. See id.
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large geographic areas. 126 Feist produced a directory covering eleven
different telephone service areas, including Rural's area.1 2 7 Both
Feist's and Rural's directories were distributed free of charge, but con-
tained advertising for whose revenue the two companies competed
vigorously.128
Because it was the sole provider of telephone services in its area,
Rural's task in publishing its directory was quite simple.' 29 It re-
quired its customers to provide names and addresses to obtain tele-
phone service, and it assigned telephone numbers corresponding to
those names and addresses.30 It then arranged that information al-
phabetically by name, and printed the results.131
Feist had no independent access to any of this information.' 32 It
offered to purchase the information from Rural, but was rebuffed.133
Rural's motive for refusing Feist's offer was to render Feist's directory
incomplete, and thus less attractive to advertisers.13 4 Notwithstand-
ing Rural's refusal, Feist decided to copy the information contained in
Rural's directory.' 3 5
Rural sued Feist for copyright infringement, arguing that the only
permissible way for Feist to obtain the information it needed was for it
to generate the information itself by means of door-to-door interviews
or telephone surveys.' 36 Feist countered that not only were such
methods costly and inefficient, they were also unnecessary because
the information it had copied was not protectable by copyright.i37
The trial court granted summary judgment for Rural on the basis
that courts had "consistently held that telephone directories are copy-
rightable." 38 The court of appeals affirmed "for substantially the rea-
sons given by the district court."i 3 9
The Supreme Court disagreed based upon what it termed "[tlhe
most fundamental axiom of copyright law,"140 namely that "'no author
may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates."'1 4 i Rural's work
126. See id.
127. See id. at 343.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 342.
132. See id. at 343.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 343-44.
136. See id. at 344.
137. See id.
138. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 63 F. Supp. 214, 218 (D. Kan. 1987).
139. See Feist Publ'ns, 499 U.S. at 344.
140. Id. at 344.
141. Id. at 345 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 556 (1985)).
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was one created by the compilation of facts without creativity, and, as
the Court found, without originality:
The sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for copyright protec-
tion, a work must be original to the author. "Original," as the term is used in
copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author
(as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some
minimal degree of creativity.
1 4 2
The Court found that although the required amount of creativity was
low, the level of creativity in Rural's alphabetical compilation of
names and telephone numbers was even lower.' 4 3
Moreover, the Court found the requirement of originality to be a
"constitutional requirement."' 44 The Court found it "unmistakably
clear" from its precedents' 4 5 that the terms "authors" and "writings"
found in the Copyright Clause "presuppose a degree of originality."'4 6
In sum, the Court ruled that "'[t]he originality requirement is consti-
tutionally mandated for all works." 4 7
The Court explained that mere factual compilations could not meet
this standard because "facts do not owe their origin to an act of au-
thorship. The distinction is one between creation and discovery: The
first person to find and report a particular fact has not created the
fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence."' 48 This is true "of
all facts-scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the day.
'[T]hey may not be copyrighted and are part of the public domain
available to every person.'"' 49
Thus, factual compilations can only rise to the required level of
originality when the compiler chooses "which facts to include, in what
order to place them, and how to arrange the collected data so that they
may be used effectively by readers."' 5 0 Congress has no power to af-
ford copyright protection to works that fall below this standard.'5' In
other words, Congress has no power to reward authors for the effort
invested in their works. Some lower courts had formulated a "sweat of
the brow" doctrine, under which some courts had granted copyright
protection to unoriginal works produced through diligent research:
142. See id. at 345 (citations omitted).
143. Id. at 363-64.
144. Id. at 346.
145. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
146. Feist Publ'ns, 499 U.S. at 346.
147. Id. at 347 (quoting L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The
Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36
UCLA L. REv. 719, 763 n.155 (1989)).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 348 (quoting Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368
(5th Cir. 1981)).
150. Id.
151. See id.
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The right to copyright a book upon which one has expended labor in its prepa-
ration does not depend upon whether the materials which he has collected
consist or not of matters which are publici juris, or whether such materials
show literary skill or originality, either in thought or in language, or anything
more than industrious collection. The man who goes through the streets of a
town and puts down the names of each of the inhabitants, with their occupa-
tions and their street number, acquires material of which he is the author.1 5 2
However, the Feist Court rejected the "sweat of the brow" doctrine.153
The Court found that this doctrine would condemn others to recreate
easily available information, when it is "'just such wasted effort that
the proscription against the copyright of ideas and facts . . . [is] de-
signed to prevent."' 154 In the Court's view, the copier's benefitting
from earlier publications is a positive virtue of the copyright system
rather than an unfair, unforeseen by-product of its operation.-55
Like Bonito Boats, Feist stands for the proposition that the Intel-
lectual Property Clause does not empower Congress to grant exclusive
rights to what the public already owns and freely uses, i.e., public do-
main knowledge and works. By basing its decisions in these cases on
the purpose of the Clause, rather than solely on the intent of Con-
gress, the Court made it clear that the public domain has constitu-
tional stature and does not exist merely at the pleasure of Congress.
In the copyright context, the effect of this constitutional grounding
is to protect the public domain in its function "as a device that permits
the rest of the system to work by leaving the raw material of author-
ship available for authors to use."156
V. THE FUTURE OF DIGITAL COPYING
A. Digital Media and the Copyright Industries
Since approximately 1981, the explosive improvement of computer
technology has been the preeminent feature of the American econ-
omy, 157 and computer-related goods and services are now our fastest-
growing industry.158 Moreover, the speed of the change toward a digi-
tized, computer-based economy is far greater than the changes
brought about by earlier, comparably revolutionary changes. It took
radio thirty-eight years from its introduction to reach fifty million
152. Id. at 352-53 (alteration in original) (quoting Jeweler's Circular Publ'g. Co. v.
Keystone Publ'g Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (2nd Cir. 1922)).
153. Id. at 353.
154. Id. at 354 (quoting Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303,
310 (2d Cir. 1966)).
155. Id. at 349.
156. Litman, supra note 27, at 968.
157. See John P. Freeman, A Business Lawyer Looks at the Internet, 49 S.C. L. REV.
903, 903-05 (1998).
158. See Ronald Rosenberg, Software Fastest Growing Industry, BOSTON GLOBE, June
5, 1997, at D2.
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users, whereas the personal computer needed only sixteen years to
accomplish the same feat, and the Internet, once it became accessible
to the general public, took only four.i159
The copyright industries deal primarily in works that can be used
or experienced by consumers on computers.' 6 0 Given sufficient
bandwidth, processor speed, and storage capacity, the great majority
of all copyrighted works can be enjoyed fully, and without perceptible
distortion, in computerized form.' 6 ' Knowledgeable commentators
have claimed that these changes will have an impact on the copyright
industries comparable to that of the introduction of the moveable-type
printing press. i 62
Digitized works can be transmitted anywhere in the world, in-
stantly and essentially without cost.i6 3 They can be copied in unlim-
ited numbers, without degradation of quality.164 The economic
implications of these realities have given rise to the claim that, at
least as a medium for the dissemination of copyrighted works, "print
on paper will go the way of the quill pen."' 6 5
As recently as six years ago, none of this was true. The advances
in computer hardware and software that permit ordinary consumers
to access these technologies at affordable prices simply did not ex-
ist.166 All earlier technologies for copying involved substantial ex-
pense and the loss of fidelity with each successive generation of
copies.' 6 7
159. See Garon, supra note 36, at 575.
160. See generally Paul Colford, Going Digital, EDITOR & PUBLISHER MAG., May 8,
2000, at N30 (describing how rapid improvements in computer technology and
Internet bandwidth have improved computer reproduction of images, sounds, and
print); Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital
Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 137 (1997) (same).
161. See Colford, supra note 160; Stefik, supra note 160.
162. See, e.g., Paul Hilts, Looking at a New Era, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, May 8, 2000 at
26 (noting the opinion of Jason Epstein, former editorial director of Random
House Inc., that digitization fundamentally changes the economics of publishing:
'The transformation that awaits writers and publishers today arises from new
technologies whose cultural influence promises to be no less revolutionary than
the introduction of movable type, a vector of civilization which these new technol-
ogies, after half a millennium, have unceremoniously replaced in the last dozen
years.").
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. Jay Greene, E-books' Brass Band, Bus. WEm, April 3, 2000, at EB46 (noting the
opinion of Dick Brass of Microsoft).
166. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d
1072, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1999); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New
Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REv. 462, 507-15
(1998).
167. See Recording Indus., 180 F.3d at 1073.
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High-bandwidth Internet connections are available at most univer-
sities, and similar services for ordinary residences are becoming
widely available. 168 Consumers can now copy, store, and exchange
digital works with ease. Millions of consumers are doing so regu-
larly,169 and growing numbers of them have access to cheap, reliable,
and permanent means of storing downloaded files on high-capacity re-
movable disks.170
The future is all but certain to see the near-total digitization of the
copyright industries. Given that prospect, it is useful to consider the
examples of two digital media that are already deeply embroiled in
controversies arising from unauthorized copying and claims of in-
fringement, namely Compact Disks (CDs) and Digital Video Disks
(DVDs).171 CDs have been the predominant medium for sales of
sound recordings for nearly a decade, and DVDs are an emerging,
highly popular medium for disseminating motion pictures. 17 2 Some
4000 motion pictures have been released in the DVD format since its
introduction in 1996. More than five million DVD players have been
sold, and DVDs are selling at the rate of more than one million per
week. 173
Free, universally available software allows computer users to "rip"
audio tracks from CDs and encode them into the MP3 format, which
greatly reduces file size without noticeably decreasing quality. 174 As
one commentator puts it, "MP3 files are so small that hundreds can fit
on a single compact disk and thousands onto a computer hard drive.
That means any desktop or laptop with decent speakers can morph
into a massive high-fidelity jukebox."175 Equally free and universally
available (though putatively illegal) software allows users to defeat
the copy protection incorporated into DVDs.176
Thousands of sites on the Internet offer MP3 files for download by
anyone, anywhere, and many of these files have been copied from pro-
prietary sound recordings without license from their owners. 177
168. See Alex Salkever, Ultimate Jukebox: The ABC's of MP3, Bus. WK., June 5, 2000,
at 134.
169. See id.
170. See Rebecca Morris, Note, When Is a CD Factory Not Like a Dance Hall?: The
Difficulty of Establishing Third-party Liability for Infringing Digital Music Sam-
ples, 18 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 257, 263 n.31 (2000) (noting the characteris-
tics and increasing availability of Compact Disc-Recordable ("CD-R") and CD-
ReWritable ("CD-RW") discs).
171. See Salkever, supra note 168, at 134.
172. See id.; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 214
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
173. See Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 214.
174. See Salkever, supra note 168, at 134.
175. Id.
176. See infra Part VI.B.3.
177. See Salkever, supra note 168, at 134.
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Rightsholders expect that the situation will soon be the same with re-
spect to DVDs.178 The MP3 situation, and the prospect of its repeti-
tion in the DVD context, have led rightsholders to petition courts to
try to put the technological genie back in its bottle.
The first of these efforts came in Recording Industry Association of
America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems Inc. 179 The RIAA requested
that the court enjoin the manufacture and sale of the Rio, a small,
easily portable personal stereo device for playing MP3 files.18o The
court denied that request, noting that in addition to infringing files,
[Tihe Internet also supports a burgeoning traffic in legitimate audio computer
files. Independent and wholly Internet record labels routinely sell and pro-
vide free samples of their artists' work online, while many unsigned artists
distribute their own material from their own websites. Some free samples are
provided for marketing purposes or for simple exposure, while others are teas-
ers intended to entice listeners to purchase either mail order recordings or
recordings available for direct download (along with album cover art, lyrics,
and artist biographies). l s8
The decision in this case turned on a narrow point of statutory inter-
pretationi8 2 with respect to the Audio Home Recording Act.13 It is
worthy of note, however, that in the course of finding that the Rio was
not a "digital audio recording device" within the meaning of the
AHRA,184 the court acknowledged the following:
The Rio merely makes copies in order to render portable, or "space-shift,"
those files that already reside on a user's hard drive. Cf Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 455, 78 L. Ed. 2d 574, 104 S.
Ct. 774 (1984) (holding that "time-shifting" of copyrighted television shows
with VCR's constitutes fair use under the Copyright Act, and thus is not an
infringement). Such copying is paradigmatic noncommercial personal use en-
tirely consistent with the purposes of the Act. i15
Despite this early suggestion that many uses of digital copying might
fall within the fair use doctrine, more recent cases suggest that courts
may well interpret copyright law in such a way as to foreclose many, if
178. See id.
179. 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
180. See id. at 1073.
181. Id. at 1074.
182. Id. at 1075 ("RIAA brought suit to enjoin the manufacture and distribution of the
Rio, alleging that the Rio does not meet the requirements for digital audio record-
ing devices under the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.
(the "Act"), because it does not employ a Serial Copyright Management System
("SCMS") that sends, receives, and acts upon information about the generation
and copyright status of the files that it plays. See id. § 1002(a)(2). RIAA also
sought payment of the royalties owed by Diamond as the manufacturer and dis-
tributor of a digital audio recording device. See id. § 1003.").
183. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
For background information on the ABRA, see Lewis Kurlantzwick & Jacqueline
E. Pennino, The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 and the Formation of Copy-
right Policy, 45 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 497 (1998).
184. See Recording Indus., 180 F.3d at 1075-78.
185. Id. at 1079.
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not all, forms of unauthorized digital copying of copyrighted works.
These cases are discussed individually below.
B. Recent Controversies in Digital Copying
1. Mymp3.com
MP3.com is a website that copied songs from about 45,000 CDs
into MP3 format and stored them on a website.18 6 Members of the
site's free service "myMP3.com" who could prove they already owned
one of these CDs could use the service to play that CD from any prop-
erly-equipped computer connected to the Internet.1 8 7 Proving owner-
ship required that the member insert the CD into a computer's CD-
ROM drive so that the service's software could authenticate the CD's
code signature (which is a form of authenticity verification, not copy
protection).1 8 8
Once this was done, the member could freely access MP3.com's
copy of desired songs via the website.18 9 Members did not actually
store their music on MP3.com's site.190 MP3.com encouraged mem-
bers to do this with all their CDs, with the result that any computer
with access to the Internet could become a "virtual jukebox" for
members.191
The owners of CDs that MP3.com copied and made available on its
website sued MP3.com for copyright infringement in UMG Record-
ings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc.192 MP3.com argued that its service was
the functional equivalent of providing free computer storage space on
the Internet for music already properly licensed by its members.1 9 3
The court found, however, that MP3.com was "re-playing for the sub-
scribers converted versions of the recordings it copied, without author-
ization, from plaintiffs' copyrighted CDs."194 The court ruled that, on
its face, this conduct was presumptively infringing under the Copy-
right Act.195 In fact, the court claimed that the case before it was an
easy one. 196 In its own words, "[t]he complex marvels of cyberspatial
186. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Mp3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y.
2000); Benny Evangelista, mp3.com Ruled in Violation of Copyrights, S.F.
CHRON., April 29, 2000, at B1.
187. See UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
188. See id.; David Shamah, User Friendly, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 23, 2000, at 9,
available at 2000 WL 825244.
189. See UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 349.
193. See id. at 350.
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. See id.
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communication may create difficult legal issues; but not in this
case."
1 97
The court swiftly dispensed with MP3.com's fair use argument,
finding that the copying was of entire works, for profit (in the form of
advertising revenue), and not transformative.19s As the court framed
the issue:
Here, although defendant recites that My.MP3.com provides a transformative
"space shift" by which subscribers can enjoy the sound recordings contained
on their CDs without lugging around the physical discs themselves, this is
simply another way of saying that the unauthorized copies are being retrans-
mitted in another medium-an insufficient basis for any legitimate claim of
transformation. 1 9 9
In doing so, the court declared that copyright law "is not designed to
afford consumer protection or convenience but, rather, to protect the
rightholders' property interests." 20 0
On the fourth factor, namely "the effect of the use upon the poten-
tial market for or value of the copyrighted work," the court noted, but
never came to grips with, MP3.com's argument that only legitimate
purchasers of CDs could access the copies it had made of the plaintiffs'
works.20 1 The court observed that the plaintiffs had the "statutory
right to license their copyrighted sound recordings to others for repro-
duction," and simply concluded that MP3.com had infringed that
right.202 Absent from this discussion was any persuasive explanation
of why MP3.com's space-shifting into another medium was any less
worthy of the court's indulgence than was the Rio's space-shifting (or
the Betamax's time-shifting) via other media.
2. Napster and Gnutella
Napster, Inc. is a small Internet company that makes its Music-
Share software available for free downloading to anyone on the In-
ternet.20 3 The software allows all users logged-on to the Napster
system to share MP3 files with one another.20 4 A user uses a search
engine contained within the software to specify the music sought, and
the engine queries the hard drives of all logged-in users for MP3 files
that meet the searcher's criteria.20 5 The majority, but not all, of the
197. See id.
198. See id. at 351-52.
199. See id. at 351.
200. Id. at 352; cf supra Part II.C.
201. UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 352.
202. Id.
203. See A & M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6243, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2000).
204. See id.
205. See id. at *4.
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MP3 files retrieved and copied via Napster in its first year of operation
were unauthorized copies of proprietary sound recordings. 20 6
On December 6, 1999, a group of record companies sued Napster
for contributory and vicarious federal copyright infringement in A &
M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc.20 7 The litigation is ongoing, though
the record companies have won the first three rounds: on May 5,
2000, the court found that Napster could not benefit from the "safe
harbor provision"208 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,209 on
July 27, 2000, the court granted a preliminary injunction against Nap-
ster;210 and on February 13, 2001, the Ninth Circuit largely endorsed
the trial court's reasoning for that injunction.2 1
The merits of those decisions are essentially irrelevant to the
larger issues at hand. Napster is the first service of its kind, and one
of the most vulnerable to legal action.2 1 2 For example, absent the
main Napster server, which is located in the U.S., the service will not
function. 213 Thus, an adverse court ruling could certainly put Napster
out of business. It is also easy to track the operation of the Napster
service using the Internet Protocol addresses of the computers
involved. 214
But other, less vulnerable services are emerging, and recent expe-
rience suggests that as soon as one is shut down, another will take its
place. 21 5 Several services like Napster are already in operation, and
hundreds more are in development. 216
Gnutella, for example, is a peer-to-peer form of file sharing that
achieves the same result as Napster without the need for a central
206. See Salkever, supra note 168, at 134. Napster does have an anti-infringement
policy, and reserves the right to exclude infringers from the service. See A & M
Records, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *6.
207. No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2000).
208. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (Supp. V 1999).
209. A & M Records, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *5-6.
210. See Alex Pham and Patti Hartigan, U.S. Court's Injunction May Silence Napster,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 27, 2000, at Al.
211. See A & M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming
in part, and reversing in part, to allow modification of the scope of the trial court's
injunction).
212. Toward this end, music industry interests recently argued in Congressional hear-
ings for even stricter regulation of digital copying. See Jacqueline Newmyer,
Company Town, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 2000, at C8; Rock Musicians Warn Legisla-
tors of Internet Piracy Peril, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2000, at C2.
213. See A & M Records, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *5-6.
214. See Salkever, supra note 168, at 134.
215. See Mike France & Richard Siklos, The Digital Revolution Will Not Be Criminal-
ized, Bus. WK., May 29, 2000, at 130.
216. See Barry de la Rosa, Pirates? They Seem More Like Pioneers, COMPUTING, May
18, 2000, at 19.
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server-or any servers at all apart from the computers of its users.2 17
Like so many Internet stories, the tale of Gnutella is strongly reminis-
cent of the myth of Pandora's Box. The program originated at AOL,
where a 21-year-old employee at its Nullsoft development division
placed a copy of the software on the division's website.218 Within 24
hours, the management of AOL had removed the software from the
website, declaring it to be the result of an "unauthorized freelance pro-
ject."21 9 But AOL's action, swift as it was, came after some 10,000
copies of the software had been downloaded. 220
Gnutella allows users with any form of Internet access to engage in
unamediated fie-swapping among themselves.2 21 Like Napster,
Gnutella can be used for sharing non-infringing files, though within
the computer industry, most knowledgeable commentators find it
"painfully obvious that most people will use Gnutella to find copy-
righted music, video, software, and images."2 2 2 And unlike Napster,
its use is not easy to detect; its users can interact anonymously, and
its software is open-source.2 23 As a result, anyone can reverse-engi-
neer, improve, and introduce new versions of Gnutella.
There is now a thriving global community of users who are swap-
ping files of all kinds without using central storage or processing cen-
ters.22 4 This absence of bottlenecks has raised the prospect of
rightsholders' being physically unable to prevent, or even monitor, the
sharing of files that is taking place. 22 5 There appears to be no means
of shutting down filesharing by this service absent shutting down In-
ternet access in its entirety.2 26 Moreover, new variants on the
Gnutella theme, such as Freenet, are making significant progress to-
ward making filesharing as anonymous and untraceable as it is un-
stoppable. 2 27 Skilled software developers around the world have
taken the Gnutella idea forward, improving it and making the fruits of
their labor freely available on the Internet. 228
217. See Don Willmott, Is Copyright Dead? With Gnutella, Exchanging MP3 Files Is
Easier Than Ever, But Is It Legal?, PC MAG., June 6, 2000, at 85.
218. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, E-Power to the People: New Software Bypasses Internet
Service Providers, WASH. PosT, May 18, 2000, at AOl.
219. Id.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. Willmott, supra note 217, at 85, 88.
223. See id. at 85.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id.
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3. DeCSS
DVDs are protected from copying by the "Content Scramble Sys-
tem, or CSS, [which] is an encryption-based security and authentica-
tion system that requires the use of appropriately configured
hardware such as a DVD player or a computer DVD drive to decrypt,
unscramble and play back, but not copy, motion pictures on DVDs."229
A group of Norwegian computer aficionados called MoRE (Masters of
Reverse Engineering) developed and distributed over the Internet a
simple, small program named DeCSS that allows users to defeat DVD
encryption. 230
A number of motion picture studios brought suit under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act,231 in Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, against defendants who they claimed had disseminated
copies of DeCSS, primarily via their websites.232 The plaintiffs did
not allege that the defendants had engaged in copyright infringement,
but rather that they "offer technology that circumvents their copyright
protection system and thus facilitates infringement."233
The court found this allegation compelling:
[Ilt is perfectly clear that CSS is a technological measure that effectively con-
trols access to plaintiffs' copyrighted movies because it requires the applica-
tion of information or a process, with the authority of the copyright owner, to
gain access to those works. Indeed, defendants conceded in their memoran-
dum that one cannot in the ordinary course gain access to the copyrighted
works on plaintiffs' DVDs without a "player key" issued by the DVD CCA that
permits unscrambling the contents of the disks. It is undisputed also that
DeCSS defeats CSS and decrypts copyrighted works without the authority of
the copyright owners.2 3 4
It is by no means clear that the court was correct in its conclusion that
DeCSS did not fall within the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's re-
verse engineering/compatibility exception 235 to the general rule
against defeating copy protection.236 That exception reads in part as
follows:
[A] person who has lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a computer
program may circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls ac-
cess to a particular portion of that program for the sole purpose of identifying
and analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary to achieve
interoperability of an independently created computer program with other
229. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 214 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
230. See Dana J. Parker, Copy This Column: The Truth About DeCSS, EMEDrA PROF.,
February, 2000, at 72, 72.
231. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05 (Supp. V 1999).
232. See 82 F. Supp. 2d at 213, 215.
233. Id. at 215.
234. Id. at 216-17.
235. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f).
236. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
[Vol. 80:64
PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC USES
programs... to the extent any such acts of identification and analysis do not
constitute infringement under this title.
2 3 7
The court asserted that the defendants had not put on adequate evi-
dence to establish that exception despite the defendants' contention
that without DeCSS, it is impossible to play DVDs on Linux-based
computers. 2 38 In light of authority establishing that intermediate
copying is fair use when it is necessary to achieve interoperability, the
court's decision is troubling.23 9
But once again, the precise contours of this legal dispute are beside
the point: "[W]hoever wins the court cases, the CSS source code isn't
going back into any bottles now."2 40 In fact, the most important point
the Reimerdes court made was social rather than legal. The court
noted that after becoming aware of the impending efforts to enjoin dis-
tribution of DeCSS,
[m]embers of the hacker community stepped up efforts to distribute DeCSS to
the widest possible audience in an apparent attempt to preclude effective judi-
cial relief. One individual even announced a contest with prizes (copies of
DVDs) for the greatest number of copies of DeCSS distributed, for the most
elegant distribution method, and for the "lowest tech" method.
2 4 1
As the following subsection will show, this anti-authoritarian attitude
is the prevailing social climate of the Internet. As a consequence, any
legal regime that seeks to restrict means of defeating copy protection
cannot succeed unless it is enforced by heroic, or even draconian,
measures.
C. Technological Negation of Fair Use Copying
Attempting to enforce copyright law by suing individual computer
users is both bad for rightsholders' public relations and largely fu-
tile.2 42 Thus, it is entirely rational for rightsholders to seek to keep
new means of sharing and copying files out of the hands of consum-
ers.2 43 For the reasons discussed above, however, rightsholders' at-
237. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1).
238. See id; see also Stephen Clark Jr., DVD Learns Linux, EMEDIA PROF., April 2000,
at 22, 22 (noting that before DeCSS, DVD-Video support for Linux "was simply
nonexistent. Many companies that develop DVD solutions apparently have cho-
sen not to invest the time and money that is required to develop Linux
software.").
239. See, e.g., Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that use of copyrighted computer work, or use of a competitor's trademark, was
fair use when necessary to achieve interoperability).
240. Richard Ball, The Copycats, ELECTRONICS WEEKLY, Mar. 22, 2000, at 24, 24.
241. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 214.
242. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Man-
agement on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REv. 557, 563-65 (1998).
243. See generally Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at
"Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CoNN. L. Ray. 981 (1996) (discussing
developments in copyright management technology and legislation, and their im-
pact on freedom of speech and expression).
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tempts to achieve this are continually being outpaced by improved
technology at the consumer level. 244
As a result, rightsholders now hope to enlist technology on their
side of the battle. They are developing Automated Rights Manage-
ment systems (ARMs)245 whose effect will be to prevent unauthorized
copying of works to which users have legitimate access. Rightsholders
are highly unlikely to limit the operation of ARM technologies to copy-
righted works, or to even attempt to work fair use copying features
into them.246 Ultimately, ARM has the potential to give rightsholders
by technology what they have never enjoyed by law:
At its most powerful, ARM supports the "superdistribution" of proprietary in-
formation. In other words, it allows information providers to market docu-
ments that disallow certain types of uses (e.g., copying) and provide
continuing revenue (e.g., charging 2o per access) regardless of who holds the
document (e.g., including someone who obtained it post-first sale). Superdis-
tribution thus offers information providers a rather daunting compendium of
powers.2 4
7
The vast majority of computer users would be unable, by them-
selves at least, to defeat ARM systems. 248 But the Internet not only
links images, sounds, files, and ideas: it also links talents. The vast
majority of the world's talented software programmers and developers
are able to communicate and collaborate with one another via the In-
ternet easily and essentially without cost. This ease of collaboration
has allowed the development of open-source, non-proprietary software
like Linux with the contributions of thousands of programmers world-
wide.249 Moreover, the idea of making the Internet itself ungovern-
able-in effect, of making it less and less subject to the laws of any
territorial authority or group of authorities-has considerable appeal
to many of those programmers. 25 0
244. See de la Rosa, supra note 216, at 19.
245. For a discussion of the analogous concept of "trusted systems," see Stefik, supra
note 160.
246. For examples of the consistent overreaching of rightsholders with respect to the
scope of their copyright monopolies, see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569 (1994); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417 (1984); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); Fox
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S.
339 (1908). See also Paul J. Heald, Payment Demands for Spurious Copyrights:
Four Causes ofAction, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 259, 259, apps. at 283-92 (1994) (pro-
viding examples of publishers' dire threats of legal action for copiers' failure to
pay royalties on public-domain works).
247. See Bell, supra note 242, at 566-67.
248. See James Raymond Davis, On Self-Enforcing Contracts, the Right to Hack, and
Willfully Ignorant Agents, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1147 (1998).
249. See Lee Gomes, Linux Gurus, Followers Differ on Napster Use, WALL ST. J., May
22, 2000, at B1.
250. See id.
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Thus, the question is not whether encryption and other means of
preventing unauthorized copying can be defeated: it can and will.
There is a global reservoir of talented volunteers who are both able
and motivated to devise means of doing so and to share them with the
public at large.251 Moreover, there are simple means of disseminating
such information and softwvare over the Internet with reliable
anonymity.252
Thus, the question is whether the Copyright Clause can be
stretched so far as to permit draconian means of deterring the use by
ordinary individuals of widely available means of defeating copy pro-
tection. As is explained below, legislation that at least partially pro-
vides for this has already been enacted. If the experience of regulating
child pornography distributed via the Internet is any indication, how-
ever, ARMs may only be feasible if penalties for circumventing them
are even more severe, and the enforcement of anticopying laws is more
vigorous and intrusive, than they are at present.25 3
VI. MILLENNIAL CHANGES IN COPYRIGHT LAW
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA")254 is the begin-
ning of the realization of rightsholders' ambitions with respect to
ARMs. While a full discussion of the DMCA is beyond the scope of this
Article, the following few provisions are more than adequate to
demonstrate the challenge the DMCA poses to fair use in a digitized,
ARM-controlled environment:
No person shall ... offer to the public, provide, or othervise traffic in any
technology... that-
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a tech-
nological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under
[the Copyright Act];
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to cir-
cumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under [the Copyright Act]; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person
with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing a technological mea-
sure that effectively controls access to a work protected under [the Copyright
Act].2 55
The DMCA defines "circumventing a technological measure" as the
employment of means used to descramble, decrypt, or "otherwise to
251. See de la Rosa, supra note 216, at 19.
252. See Cohen, supra note 243, at 1092.
253. See Lesli C. Esposito, Note, Regulating the Internet: The New Battle Against
Child Pornography, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 541 (1998); see also Salkever,
supra note 168, at 135 ("So far, no one has been prosecuted for pirating MP3 files
for personal use.").
254. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 17 U.S.C.).
255. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (Supp. V 1999).
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avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure,
without the authority of the copyright owner."2 56 Moreover it clarifies
that "a technological measure 'effectively controls access to a work' if
the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the ap-
plication of information, or a process or a treatment, with the author-
ity of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work."2 5 7
The broad sweep of this language is only emphasized by the word-
ing of some of the provisions meant to limit it.258 For example, two of
the items listed under the heading "Other Rights, Etc., Not Af-
fected"259 appear to be very much affected. The first reads as follows:
"Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or
defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this ti-
tle."26 0 The second reads similarly: "Nothing in this section shall en-
large or diminish vicarious or contributory liability for copyright
infringement in connection with any technology, product, service, com-
ponent, device, or part thereof."2 61
The emphasized prepositional phrases highlight the problem: to
all appearances, liability for violation of section 1201 is not liability for
"copyright infringement."26 2 Moreover, section 1204 provides for
criminal penalties of up to $500,000 and five years in prison for a first-
offense violation of section 1201 so long as that violation is "willful[ ]
and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain"2 63-like the unlicensed parody in Campbell.264
Thus, unless the courts interpret it more narrowly than its plain
language appears to require, the DMCA sets up a legal regime under
which fair use of digital works protected by an ARM would give rise to
civil-or even criminal-liability. In the highly digitized world of the
near future, this represents a de facto abrogation of the better part of
the fair use doctrine. 26 5
This substantial increase in the scope of the copyright monopoly is
matched by a substantial increase in its duration. The Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act 2 66 amended the Copyright Act to ex-
tend the term of copyright protection from the life of the author plus
256. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
257. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B).
258. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the
Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519,
520-23 (1999).
259. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c).
260. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (emphasis added).
261. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(2) (emphasis added).
262. See Samuelson, supra note 258, at 539-41; 17 U.S.C. § 1203(a).
263. 17 U.S.C. § 1204(a).
264. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
265. See Cohen, supra note 243, at 1139-42.
266. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 17 U.S.C.).
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fifty years to life plus seventy years, keeping currently protected
works out of the public domain for a minimum of twenty additional
years.26 7 The Bono Act was the product of an intense lobbying cam-
paign by rightsholders like The Walt Disney Company, many of whose
works were approaching the end of their copyright terms.268
Thus, the question arises whether Congress's latest efforts on be-
half of rightsholders go beyond its power under the Copyright Clause.
VII. THE LIMITS OF CONGRESS'S POWER UNDER THE
COPYRIGHT CLAUSE
A. "To Promote" As an Interpretive Guide
"When Congress grants an exclusive right or monopoly, its effects
are pervasive; no citizen or State may escape its reach."2 69 Accord-
ingly, it is an appropriate limitation on Congress's discretion that
"[tihe monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize through copy-
right grants are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a
special private benefit."2 70 The ultimate interpretive guide for deter-
mining whether Congress has accorded a private benefit or an unlim-
ited privilege lies in the "to promote" language of the Copyright
Clause.
According to a prominent commentator, "[this introductory phrase
is in the main explanatory of the purpose of copyright, without in itself
constituting a rigid standard against which any copyright act must be
measured. Its effect at most is to suggest certain minimal elements to
be contained in copyright legislation."2 71 According to this view, the
introduction to the Clause is like the Preamble to the Constitution:
inspirational, but not enforceable. 2 72
While it is entirely reasonable to suppose that an introductory
phrase imposes no "rigid" standards, it is less reasonable to posit that
such a phrase is of little or no interpretative value when interpreta-
tion is unavoidable. The Supreme Court has been called upon to in-
validate Congressional acts under the Clause in the past,2 73 and may
face similar calls in the near future.
267. See Garon, supra note 36, at 522-23.
268. See id. at 523. The proponents of the bill also argued that it was important to the
United States balance of trade to match the duration of protection afforded under
European copyright law. See Christina N. Gifford, Note, The Sonny Bono Copy-
right Term Extension Act, 30 U. MEM. L. Rav. 363, 386-88 (2000).
269. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973).
270. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
271. MELVILLE B. NZIMER & DAVID NIMIER, 1 NIIIER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03 (2001).
272. See id.; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905).
273. See, e.g., Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (striking down as unconstitu-
tional an act of Congress that attempted to regulate trademarks beyond their use
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That Congress may choose among competing schemes of regulation
(or non-regulation) for achieving the ends of the Clause is clear.2 74
Less clear, but no less important, is what standard courts should ap-
ply in determining whether Congress has granted copyright protection
that serves no legitimate purpose under the Clause.2 75 In the silence
left to us by the Framers' unanimous approval of the Clause, only its
text and the occasional glosses on that text by the Supreme Court are
of much use in finding an appropriate standard.
If the purpose of copyright protection is to disseminate expressive
works throughout the country as broadly as possible, as the prelimi-
nary language suggests and the Court has affirmed, 2 76 then interpret-
ing the remainder of the Clause is comparatively simple. That
exclusive rights are central to the Clause's approach to achieving this
shows that the role of economics, and specifically of authors' incen-
tives, is critical. That the protection to be granted under the Clause
must be temporary ensures the (eventual) widespread enjoyment of
works because of their availability for free duplication.
The difficulty arises when Congress elects to enhance one of the
two-authors' rights or public access-at the expense of the other.
Without resorting to the goal of "promot[ing] the progress of science"
as an interpretive guide, it is difficult to determine whether legislation
is a legitimate exercise in balancing needs or an illegitimate exercise
in accommodating rent-seekers. 2 77
Bearing that language in mind, however, a solution becomes obvi-
ous: Congress may balance between the two any way it chooses, so
long as it does not foreclose altogether any significant aspect of one or
the other, and so long as there is a logical basis for concluding that
Congress's action might enhance the dissemination and enjoyment of
copyrightable works.
As the following subsections will show, however, Congress's latest
efforts in the copyright arena fall well short of this standard.
in commerce with foreign nations, among the several states, and with Native
American tribes).
274. See, e.g., Scnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Congress need
not 'require that each copyrighted work be shown to promote the useful arts
.... "); Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860
(5th Cir. 1979) (refusing to disqualify morally suspect works from enjoying copy-
right protection); 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAw AND PRACTICE 123-30
(1994) (discussing article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution).
275. See Merges & Reynolds, supra note 15, at 63.
276. Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43
UCLA L. REV. 1, 20 (1995).
277. See Cohen, supra note 15, at 1131.
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B. 'Exclusive Right" Versus Noncompeting Uses
The "exclusive Right" of authors provided for by the Constitution
has never been absolute.2 78 The idea/expression dichotomy,279 the
"first sale" doctrine,2 80 and the misuse doctrine 28 1 are only a few of
the many means by which courts have traditionally limited the scope
of authors' exclusive rights. No U.S. copyright regime has ever given
the copyright owner "complete control over all possible uses of his
work"28 2 :
Rather, the Copyright Act grants the copyright holder "exclusive" rights to use
and to authorize the use of his work in five 2 8 3 qualified ways, including repro-
duction of the copyrighted work in copies. All reproductions of the work, how-
ever, are not within the exclusive domain of the copyright owner .... Any
individual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a "fair use"; the copyright
owner does not possess the exclusive right to such a use.2 8 4
More importantly, the doctrine of fair use is older than the U.S.
copyright system. Under the Statute of Anne, for example, British
courts found at least some uses of others' works to be "fair abridge-
ments."28 5 Accordingly, while the first U.S. Copyright Act contained
no explicit fair use provision, courts applying that Act recognized that
the scope of copyright protection against noncompeting uses by others
was far from absolute. 28 6 Moreover, "long before the enactment of the
Copyright Act of 1909, it was settled that the protection given to copy-
rights is wholly statutory,"28 7 and is thus limited rather than plenary
in scope. 28 8 When Congress codified the fair use doctrine in the 1976
Act, moreover, it did so with the intent of endorsing and continuing
this "common-law tradition of fair use adjudication."28 9
278. See L. Ray Patterson, Copyright and the "Exclusive Right" ofAuthors, 1 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 9-14 (1993).
279. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
280. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994); Quality King Distribs., Inc., v. L'Anza Research
Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 150 (1998).
281. See generally James A-D. White, Misuse or Fair Use: That Is the Software Copy-
right Question, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 251 (1997) (discussing the emergence of
the copyright misuse doctrine).
282. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984).
283. There are now six exclusive rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. V 1999);
Needham J. Boddie, II et al., A Review of Copyright and the Internet, 20 CAMp-
BELL L. REV. 193, 222-30 (1998) (providing a brief overview of the six exclusive
rights).
284. Sony, 464 U.S. at 432-33 (citations omitted).
285. See PATRY, supra note 274, at 6-17.
286. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576-77 (1994). For an early
example of a court's applying what modern jurists would recognize as the fair use
doctrine, see Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136).
287. Sony, 464 U.S. at 431 (citation omitted); accord Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8
Pet.) 591, 661-62 (1834).
288. See, e.g., Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U.S. 123, 151 (1889) (noting that the rights
of authors under the Copyright Act "are only those prescribed by Congress").
289. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.
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These limits grew out of the "to promote" imperative of the Copy-
right Clause "as a necessary incident of the constitutional policy of
promoting the progress of science and the useful arts, since a prohibi-
tion of such use would inhibit subsequent writers from attempting to
improve upon prior works and thus... frustrate the very ends sought
to be attained."2 90 Denying noncompeting uses of copyrighted works
to subsequent authors under the copyright law would tend to "'stifle
the very creativity [that it) is designed to foster."' 29 1 Controls on tech-
nologies that defeat copy protection threaten to do precisely that.
In digital media, which will shortly be the primary means of dis-
seminating the vast majority of copyrighted works, copy protection
will always be both feasible and defeasible. It is entirely possible to
put digital copying of copyrighted works beyond the ability of ordinary
consumers so long as they remain unaided by experts. It is impossi-
ble, however, to prevent experts from disseminating the keys with
which to unlock copy protection-and from doing so anonymously and
undetectably. It is therefore impossible to prevent consumers from
having access to those keys.
For copy protection schemes to work, therefore, it is the consumer,
rather than the expert, who must be the target of efforts to deter the
unlocking of protected works. In effect, copy protection can only suc-
ceed when all digital copying not specifically authorized by rights-
holders is criminalized. Depending upon how its rather opaque
language is interpreted, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act may
well be a very large step in this direction, and the political power of
rightsholders suggests that it will not be the last.
Preventing infringement by denying the public the means to in-
fringe is a new and very troubling approach to protecting rights-
holders. Admittedly, it is true that the history of copyright legislation
is replete with examples of revolutionary new technologies that have
prompted changes in the law. For example, it was the invention of the
printing press that gave rise to the need for copyright protection when
it made copying for profit feasible for the first time (infringement by
manuscript being largely unprofitable).2 92 Likewise, the advent of the
player piano provided at least part of the impetus for the 1909 revision
of the Copyright Act.293 And in the latter half of the Twentieth Cen-
tury, the improved ability of high-fidelity tape recorders to capture
290. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (alter-
ation in original) (quoting H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY
260 (1944)).
291. Harper & Row, Publishers, 471 U.S. at 550 n.3 (quoting Iowa State Univ. Re-
search Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)).
292. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 430.
293. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 431 n.11; see also White-Smith Music Publ'g. Co. v. Apollo
Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (holding that copying a musical composition for use on a
player piano was not prohibited).
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sound prompted Congress to enact the Sound Recording Amendment
of 1971.294
But these legislative responses did not consist of outlawing print-
ing presses, player pianos, or tape decks. Nor did they impose a
scheme of governmental licensing or monitoring of their private use.
This restraint suggests that, at least until recently, Congress has
kept both essential policies of the Copyright Clause-encouragement
of authors and public use-firmly in mind. Congress tailored its legis-
lative responses to technical challenges according to two factors:
First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the
public; and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to
the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under the proper terms and
conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the
temporary monopoly. 2 9 5
In forbidding the unlocking of digital works, however, Congress
has lost sight of the second of these factors. While "fair use analysis
must always be tailored to the individual case," 29 6 copy protection
schemes deny fair use and infringement equally. Whereas Congress
formerly agreed with the Supreme Court that fair use was a doctrine
that needed careful and flexible application, it has now sanctioned its
inflexible (indeed, in the digital context, universal) abolition.
There is good reason to believe that this extreme response is un-
necessary to protect authors' incentives. First, with respect to many
consumers, "piracy" is not an issue. Large, institutional consumers
are sufficiently high-profile and well-funded for rightsholders to police
effectively through their protective associations.2 97 Moreover, among
individual consumers, many are actually honest in the relevant sense:
they would not make intentional, infringing use of unauthorized cop-
ies.2 98 And there is no reason to believe that unauthorized downloads
of digital works inevitably, or even often, replace purchases that the
downloading parties would otherwise have made.29 9
Second, the switch to digital media, with their low overhead and
universal availability, will allow many aspiring authors to sell directly
to the public, as the famous novelist Stephen King did with his recent
294. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.); see Sony, 464 U.S. at 431 n.11.
295. Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 n.10 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909)).
296. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985); ac-
cord Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994).
297. See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (hold-
ing that it was not fair use for Texaco to make unauthorized copies of medical and
scientific journals for use of its researchers).
298. For a discussion of the social role played by expectations of honest conduct, see
Steven H. Resnicoff, Is It Morally Wrong to Depend on the Honesty of Your Part-
ner or Spouse? Bankruptcy Dischargeability of Vicarious Debt, 42 CASE W. REs. L.
REv. 147 (1992).
299. Siklos & Brull, supra note 35, at 120.
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direct-to-web work Riding the Bullet.300 This will allow them to enjoy
a larger proportion of the revenue stream generated by their works,
even if illicit copying siphons away part of that revenue. 30 ' Regard-
less of how revenue is divided between authors and publishers, if the
recent history of new musical technology is any indication, that
stream is likely to be a flood rather than a trickle:
The switch to CDs from vinyl in the 1980s allowed music companies to re-
release the entire history of music with minimal production costs. With the
Net, the payoff could be all the more staggering. As more and more people
come online, new ways of selling and packaging music-and using the Web for
marketing-should mean a boon for the labels and radio, better terms for art-
ists, and a consumer paradise. 3 0 2
Moreover, even publishers should benefit from the increased over-
all audience and decreased costs of reaching that audience that the
universal availability of digital works will bring about:
[T]he Web will allow the labels to market their talent in remarkable new ways
while also using the medium to reap huge savings on everything from the
production of CDs to the millions wasted on marketing new releases that don't
succeed. Just as NBC spawned cable channels CNBC and MSNBC, and ABC
teamed with sports channel ESPN, the big music "networks" should be able to
not only find more buyers for their music but also to tap into new revenue
streams such as advertising and e-commerce that until now have been strictly
the domain of radio and retail. 3 0 3
Third and finally, encryption can never stop true pirates, like those
who use Third World factories to spin out CDs and DVDs by the mil-
lion. They have all the funding they need to buy the talent required to
decrypt the target works, and what they do has been highly illegal for
decades. 30 4 Compared to the efforts of true pirates, the sales revenues
lost to the depredations of MP3-downloading computer users are com-
paratively small.30 5
Thus, the attack on the means of copying digital works represents
an unacceptable tradeoff under the Copyright Clause: it overreacts to
a manageable threat by overprotecting authors' incentives to produce
at the expense of largely eradicating the public's right to use copy-
righted works under the fair use doctrine in the digital environment of
the all-too-near future.3 06 Congress's most recent efforts in this area
300. John Mutter, Book Trade Predictions, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, April 10, 2000, at 31,
31.
301. See Siklos & Brull, supra note 35, at 128-29; Greene, supra note 165, at EB46,
EB48.
302. See Siklos & Brull, supra note 35, at 127.
303. Id. at 124.
304. See Ball, supra note 240, at 24.
305. See id.
306. Admittedly, the possibility remains that consumers could copy digital works by
analog means, such as taping from a CD, video-recording from a viewscreen, or
copying down text by hand. But it is likely that a vigorous anticopying regime
would reach at least some of these activities, and some forms of fair use copying
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of legislation have fallen afoul of the pitfall inherent in copyright pro-
tection "that granting authors a complete monopoly will reduce the
creative ability of others.307 Consequently, the "exclusive Right" of
authors under the Copyright Clause should not be interpreted to au-
thorize Congress to forbid or criminalize the circumvention of copy-
right protection for the purpose of engaging in fair use copying. 308
C. "For Limited Times" Versus Creeping Perpetuity
It is generally accepted that the Copyright Clause means what it
says: the Clause gives Congress no power to establish permanent
copyright 30 9 or patent rights.3i0 It is also widely accepted that the
duration of exclusive rights under the Clause is subject to Congress's
discretion.3 1 1 The Supreme Court has noted that the "evolution of the
duration of copyright protection tellingly illustrates the difficulties
Congress faces in [implementing the Copyright Clause] .... Absent
an explicit statement of congressional intent,... it is not our role to
alter the delicate balance Congress has labored to achieve."31 2
In the early days of the Copyright Clause, however, it was gener-
ally expected that this balance would favor a brief period of exclusiv-
ity, to be followed by universal, free enjoyment of the formerly
protected work by the public. In the words of Joseph Story, written
less than fifty years after the framing of the Clause:
It is beneficial to all parties, that the national government should possess this
power; to authors and inventors, because, otherwise, they would be subjected
to the varying laws and systems of the different states on this subject, which
would impair, and might even destroy the value of their rights; to the public,
as it will promote the progress of science and the useful arts, and admit the
people at large, after a short interval, to the full possession and enjoyment of
all writings and inventions without restraint.313
can only be effectively achieved by digital copying. See Robert M. Szymanski,
Audio Pastiche: Digital Sampling, Intermediate Copying, and Fair Use, 3 UCLA
ENTr. L. REV. 271, 290-93 (1996).
307. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 479 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
308. See Cohen, supra note 243, at 1140-42.
309. See Marx v. U.S., 96 F.2d 204, 205-06 (9th Cir. 1938) (upholding a portion of the
1909 Copyright Act against constitutional challenge by construing it to be subject
to limitations on duration contained elsewhere in the Act); U.S. v. Moghadam,
175 F.3d 1269, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting in dicta the possible invalidity of a
criminal copyright statute that did not take duration into account).
310. See Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 16-17 (1892).
311. See id. ("[Tihis exclusive right shall exist but for a limited period, and that...
period shall be subject to the discretion of congress."); see also discussion supra
Part IV.B.
312. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990) (citations omitted).
313. JOSEPH STORY, COiMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 558, at 402-03 (1987) (emphasis added).
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Because of the effect it has on incentives to produce new works, the
period of exclusivity provided for by copyright is a good thing. None-
theless, the numerous extensions of copyright duration in this cen-
tury3 1 4 have sorely tested Mae West's dictum that "[t]oo much of a
good thing can be wonderful"315: the rate of the increase in the copy-
right term has more than equaled the passage of time between exten-
sions.316 If this trend continues-and there is no reason to believe
that it will not-no work created after the 1920s will ever fall into the
public domain absent procedural default or express dedication by the
author.3 17
This trend has vitiated the second half of the justification for the
copyright monopoly; namely, that it will "allow the public access to the
products of [authors'] genius after the limited period of exclusive con-
trol has expired."31 8 Moreover, there is no credible reason to believe
the Bono Act's contribution to this trend will add to the incentive of
authors to produce.
The proposition that any duration of more than the original period
of fourteen years affords significant incentive to produce is subject to
serious question.31 9 After all, only a very few works are still produc-
ing any significant revenue fourteen years after their publication, and
those works are the very ones that afford their authors the greatest
financial rewards. 3 20 As a result,
[a] Ithough there is no empirical research, one can hardly imagine that authors
would cease to write, painters to paint, or software designers to design works
if the copyright term were reduced-even to the fifty-six years (twenty-eight
year term plus twenty-eight year renewal) afforded to authors prior to Janu-
ary 1, 1978. Indeed, software may become commercially obsolete after less
than six months. A few works survive the test of time and remain a valuable
commodity throughout the term of the copyright. Most works, however, never
make it into circulation, and of those that do, only a tiny fraction have a
residual value that continues throughout the life of work.3 2 1
The sole notable, additional element of incentive provided by
changes in the law of copyright duration came with the 1976 Act,
which measured duration from the author's death.322 But even as-
suming for purposes of argument that there is some motivating power
to the slim chance of leaving a performing asset to heirs as much as
314. See BARD & KURLANTZWICK, supra note 37, at 7-9.
315. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate
America, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 79 (1997).
316. See BARD & KURLANTZWICK, supra note 37, at 7-9.
317. See id.
318. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
319. See Saul Cohen, Duration, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1181 (1977).
320. See id. at 1181-89.
321. Garon, supra note 36, at 518-19.
322. See id.
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fifty years after an author's death, the Bono Act faces an insurmount-
able obstacle with respect to its validity under the Copyright Clause.
The constitutional question posed by the Bono Act is whether Con-
gress's discretion in fixing copyright duration stretches far enough to
justify twenty more years' deprivation of the public domain. The only
way it can do so is if it can reasonably-or even conceivably-motivate
authors to create in exchange for exclusive rights extending seventy
years beyond their deaths who would not have done so for a mere fifty
years of exclusivity beyond their deaths.
The economic realities of publishing copyrighted works show that
those extra twenty years simply cannot motivate authors to create
works that would not have been created before the change in the law:
The decision to invest in producing a creative work is influenced in part by
economic considerations. Investing time and money now produces a cash flow
in the future, so one must trade off the time and money invested now with the
potential returns in the future .... [the Bono Act] ... will therefore have an
insignificant effect on the incentives to produce such works .... mhe value of
investment returns after 50 years in the future has a minuscule present value
compared to the early returns. Hence the value of the cash flows during these
later periods has a tiny effect on the present economic incentives to invest in
creative works.3 23
Absent the continued, annual growth of the public domain, the cost
and effort involved in creating new derivative works increases. 3 24 The
Campbell Court found these words of Justice Story appropriate to the
issue before it, and they are equally well taken here:
[Iln truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if
any, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original through-
out. Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily
borrow, and use much which was well known and used before.32 5
Absent the Bono Act, the public would not only be free to use un-
copyrightable information generated by others, but also to copy at will
from others' expressions published in the (comparatively) recent past.
This is the purpose of the public domain, and given the Supreme
Court's emphatic endorsement of the constitutional status of the pub-
lic domain in Bonito Boats and Feist, the Bono Act fails to pass the
required level of scrutiny:
The constitutional rationale for such an approach is simple: the phrase "to
promote the progress of science and the useful arts" is inherently prospective.
It states a utilitarian, incentive-based rationale for intellectual property pro-
tection. If the term of protection could not, under any plausible set of assump-
323. Garon, supra note 36, at 519 n.134 (quoting the affidavit of Hal R. Varian, Dean
of the School of Information Management and Systems at the University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley, filed in Eldred v. Reno, No. 1:99CV00065 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 11,
1999)).
324. See Garon, supra note 36, at 600.
325. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting Emerson v.
Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436)).
20011
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
tions, serve as an incentive, it fails the constitutional requirement of a
forward-looking grant of property rights.3 2 6
Of course, the Bono Act may be justified as desirable policy by such
concerns as the rationalization of copyright regimes between the
United States and Europe. 32 7 From the perspective of the Copyright
Clause, however, this is irrelevant: the sole concern of the Clause is to
provide for the widest enjoyment of works of authorship that is consis-
tent with the preservation of authors' incentive to create. The Bono
Act frustrates this concern.
Nonetheless, the only court that has had an occasion to test the
constitutionality of the Bono Act chose to uphold it, apparently on the
basis that Congress's discretion to extend the copyright term is unlim-
ited.32s In the interests of avoiding the complete ossification of the
public domain's stock of formerly copyrighted works, higher courts
should revisit this issue and weigh it with care.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The sole justification for the copyright monopoly lies in its effect of
providing the incentive for authors to create new works for public use
and enjoyment. To the extent that the public can use those works
without endangering that incentive, the Copyright Clause requires
that it be allowed to do so. The Clause does not authorize legislation
that curtails noncompeting public uses of copyrighted works, or that
keeps such works from falling into the public domain even after long
periods of exclusivity.
Such legislation expands a governmentally-enforced monopoly
without a corresponding benefit to society. Unless it is able to justify
this expansion under sources of law other than the Copyright Clause,
the judiciary should invalidate the relevant portions of Congress's
most recent copyright legislation.
326. Merges & Reynolds, supra note 15, at 65-66.
327. See BARD & KURLANTZWICK, supra note 37, at 191-201; Lisa M. Brownlee, Recent
Changes in the Duration of Copyright in the United States and European Union:
Procedure and Policy, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 579 (1996)
(examining the practical effects and policy implications of new and proposed
copyright laws in the United States and the European Union).
328. See Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1999).
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